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I. INTRODUCTION
H UMANITY'S SURVIVAL depends on moving out into the
cosmos while the window of opportunity for doing so still
exists. Besides helping to ensure the survival of humankind, the
settling of space-including the establishment of permanent
human settlements on the Moon and Mars-will bring incalcu-
lable economic and social benefits to all nations. The settle-
ment of space would benefit all of humanity. It would open a
new frontier, provide resources and room for growth of the
human race without despoiling the Earth, energize our society,
and as Dr. Stephen Hawking has pointed out, create a lifeboat
for humanity that could survive even a planet-wide catastrophe.'
But, as Dr. Lawrence Risley pointed out, "Exploration is not sui-
cidal and it is usually not altruistic, rather it is a means to obtain
wealth. There must be rewards for the risks being taken."2
Unfortunately, neither private enterprise nor government
currently has a sufficient incentive to invest the billions of dol-
l Sylvia Hui, Hawking Says Humans Must Colonize Space, SPACE.COM, June 13,
2006, http://www.space.com/news/060613-ap-hawking-space.html. In Hawk-
ing's words:
It is important for the human race to spread out into space for the
survival of the species.... Life on Earth is at the ever-increasing risk
of being wiped out by a disaster, such as sudden global warming,
nuclear war, a genetically engineered virus or other dangers we
have not yet thought of.
Id.
2 Lawrence L. Risley, An Examination of the Need to Amend Space Law to Protect the
Private Explorer in Outer Space, 26 W. ST. U. L. RE\,. 47, 47-48 (1998-99).
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lars necessary to make space settlement happen. In the private
sector, even the recent accomplishments of space entrepreneurs
such as Richard Branson and Robert Bigelow are but tiny steps
towards settlement.' These billionaires may be able to get a few
passengers to low Earth orbit, but it is very unlikely that they will
finance technology for people to live in space, especially on the
Moon or Mars.4 They may be wealthy, but they are not that
wealthy. And the U.S. government's current "Return to the
Moon" plan5 has numerous hurdles, not the least of which is
whether financing will be sustained over the next decades by
future administrations. In any case, the goal of the program is
not a thriving settlement on the Moon, but rather a limited, gov-
ernment-run Moon base.6 The government space programs of
other countries are even farther behind with regard to space
settlement. 7
There appears to be one incentive, however, that could spark
massive private investment leading to the establishment of per-
manent space settlements on the Moon and beyond with an im-
mediate payback to investors. The concept of "land claims
recognition" (developed by author Alan Wasser and others over
the last twenty years) seems to be the most powerful economic
incentive, much more so than all the other incentives, such as
government-funded prizes and corporate tax holidays
combined.'
If and when the Moon and Mars are settled in the future
through other incentives, the nations of Earth will eventually
have to recognize these settlements' authority over their own
land. But to create an incentive now, governments would need
to commit to recognizing that ownership in advance, rather
than long after the fact.
3 Cathy B. Thomas, The Space Cowboys, TIME, Feb. 22, 2007, available at http://
www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1592834,00.html.
4 See id.
See Guy Gugliotta, NASA Unveils $104 Billion Plan to Return to Moon by 2018,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2005, at A03.
6 See Warren E. Leary, NASA Plans Permanent Moon Base, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/science/space/05nasa.
html.
7 See Spurred by NASA, Russia Plans Its Own Moon Base, CANADIAN BROAD. CTR.,
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/08/31/science-russia-moon.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
8 Douglas 0. Jobes & Alan B. Wasser, Land Claims Recognition (LCR) Analysis:
Leveraging the Inherent Value of Lunar Land For Billions in Private Sector Investment,
SPACE SETrTLEMENT INST., Aug. 18, 2004, http://www.space-settlement-institute.
org/Articles/LCRbrieftext.htm.
2008]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Land claims recognition legislation would commit the Earth's
nations, in advance, to allowing a true private Lunar settlement
to claim and sell (to people back on Earth) a reasonable
amount of Lunar real estate in the area around the base, thus
giving the founders of the Moon settlement a way to earn back
the investment they made to establish the settlement.9 Appro-
priate conditions could be set in the law, such as the establish-
ment of an Earth-Moon space line open to all paying passengers
regardless of nationality.' °
The many other aspects of the land claims recognition con-
cept are discussed in detail elsewhere, 1 but a major point of
related debate involves what international law has to say about
the legality of a private entity, such as a space settlement owned
by a corporation or individual, claiming ownership of land on a
celestial body like the Moon on the basis of "occupation and
9 It cannot be stressed enough that the reason for land claims recognition leg-
islation is not to establish a good property rights regime for its own sake, nor is it
to protect Lunar residents from claim jumping, which will not, in fact, be a prob-
lem, as will be shown later. See The Space Settlement Initiative, http://www.space
settlement.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). The sole reason is to create the only
product that a privately funded space settlement could sell to the public back on
Earth for sufficient profit to justify the tremendous cost of establishing a space
settlement. Id. This product is hundreds of millions of paper deeds that are
recognized by the U.S. government and other governments as bonafide deeds to
acres of Lunar or Martian land, printed on Earth for pennies apiece, and sold to
investors on Earth for perhaps one hundred dollars each. Id.
The chain of reasoning is as follows: The objective is promoting the settlement
of space-the day when ordinary people will live and work in thriving communi-
ties on the Moon and Mars. We do not want the Moon and Mars to be perma-
nent wastelands like Antarctica, but instead we want them developed like Alaska.
This goal would require an enormous up-front investment, but government has
proven unwilling or unable to make this investment. Id. Private enterprise could
make this investment, but only if there were a prospect of a quick, enormous
profit upon success. Id. For this, there needs to be a very profitable product that
a privately funded space settlement could sell to the public back on Earth. Id. It
would be ideal if every nation of the world allowed the sale and acknowledged
the validity of the deeds but, since the biggest pool of money is concentrated in
the U.S., and the U.S. tends to lead the way in economic matters, it is U.S. recog-
nition that is by far the most important. A claim of 600,000 square miles-
around four percent of the Moon's surface and roughly the size of Alaska-
would contain 384,000,000 acres, so at even a conservative price of one hundred
dollars per acre it would be worth almost forty billion dollars. Id.
10 See Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
11 See, e.g., Douglas Jobes, Lunar Land Claims Recognition: Designing the Ultimate
Incentive for Space Infrastructure Development, SPACE TIMES, May/June 2005, at 4; see
also Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
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use."'1 2 The following discussion lays out the argument that cur-
rent international law, and especially "the Outer Space Treaty,"
does appear to permit private property ownership in space and
permit nations on Earth to recognize land ownership claims
made by private space settlements, without these nations being
guilty of national appropriation or any other legal violation.
II. A TALE OF TWO TREATIES
The 1967 Treaty On Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"3 generally called the Outer
Space Treaty, is the primary basis for most international space
law. The treaty was negotiated by the United States and the So-
viet Union in order to end the costly space race between them.14
There were, of course, a great many differences between the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which had to be compromised or
papered-over in order to get a treaty agreement. 5 For example,
the U.S.S.R. wanted to ban all private enterprise space activity
but the U.S. refused. 16
12 See generally Thomas Gangale, A Limited International Agreement on Property
Rights, 2007-6072 AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS (2007).
13 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 11,
Jan. 27, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
14 U.S. STATE DEP'T, SPACE GOALS AFTER THE LUNAR LANDING 13-16 (1966)
available at http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/research_library/
SpaceGoals1966.pdf (this document was declassified pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act request by one of the authors of this Article).
15 See generally U.S. Delegation on Negotiations With the Soviets on the Legal
Problems of Outer Space, Position Paper, Sept. 24, 1963 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Position Paper] (describing the U.S. government's position regard-
ing the Soviet draft of the Outer Space Treaty) (this Position Paper was declassi-
fied Oct. 3, 1990 and was obtained from the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas).
16 Id. at 7. The U.S. negotiators were not sure whether this was "an attempt to
extend Communist principles to outer space" or just a negotiating tactic. Id.
That is, the Americans thought the U.S.S.R. might just want to trade "a Soviet
concession on private companies in outer space" for U.S. concessions on issues
such as banning the use of satellites for war propaganda or the Soviet proposal
that "the use of artificial satellites for the collection of intelligence information in
the territory of a foreign state is incompatible with the objectives of mankind in
its conquest of outer space." Id. at 7, 9; Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite
Weapons Programs, SPACE WEAPONS BASICS (Union of Concerned Scientists, Cam-
bridge, Mass.), at n.3, http://www.ucsusa.org/global-security/space-weapons/a-
history-of-asat-programs.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008) (quoting the 1962 draft
proposal given to the U.N. legal subcommittee by the Soviets). The U.S. compro-
mise proposal "insures that each national government accepts responsibility for
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In many cases, the solution was to insert vague language that
could be interpreted whichever way the reader wanted, but
would leave the enactment of any real rules to a future discus-
sion. At the U.S. Senate ratification hearings for the Treaty, Ar-
thur Goldberg, who led the U.S. negotiating team, was asked
about Article I of the treaty, and he told the Senators that "the
article [was] a 'broad general declaration of purposes' that
would have no specific impact until its intent was detailed in
subsequent, detailed agreements." 7
About a decade later, there was a serious attempt to produce
such a detailed agreement, the 1979 "Agreement on the Activi-
ties of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"18 gener-
ally referred to as "The 1979 Moon Treaty."' 9 The agreement
would have banned all private property in space, and for that
reason, among others, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it.20 No
other space-faring nation ratified it either.21 Therefore, it is
its activities and those of its nationals, and is internationally liable for them."
Position Paper, supra note 15, at 7.
17 John W. Finney, Space Treaty Called 'Fuzzy' at Senate Hearings: Rusk and
Goldberg Dispute Unexpected Objections by Gore and Fulbright, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1967,
at 20.
18 Agreement Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1984 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
19 Wayne N. White Jr., Presentation at the 40th Colloquium on the Law of
Space of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: Real Property
in Outer Space 1 (Oct. 6-10, 1997), available at http://www.space-settlement-in-
stitute.org/Articles/researchlibrary/WayneWhite98-2.pdf.
The 1979 Moon Treaty contains a non-appropriation clause which
is more inclusive than Article II [of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty].
Although Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Moon Treaty reiterates the
language of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 11, para-
graph 3 further provides that 'neither the surface nor subsurface of
the moon .. . shall become property of any state, international in-
ter-governmental or non-governmental organization, national or-
ganization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person'
(references to 'the moon' in the Moon Treaty refer to all celestial
bodies and areas of outer space other than Earth and Earth orbits).
The [Moon] treaty also says, in Article 11, paragraph 1, that 'the
moon and its natural resources are the 'common heritage of man-
kind.' Opponents of the treaty note that the developing nations
often interpret 'common heritage' to mean 'common property' of
mankind. As a result, the Moon Treaty has encountered resistance
from countries with free market economies.
Id. at 5; See also Moon Treaty, supra note 18, art. 11.
20 See White, supra note 19.
21 Id.
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generally agreed today that the Moon Treaty is non-binding and
not a part of international law.22 As Kurt Anderson Baca notes,
The Moon Treaty outlaws property rights in any celestial body
absent the establishment of an international regime. The Moon
Treaty also aims at closing the avenue toward property and quasi-
sovereignty left by the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty,
however, has yet not been ratified by any major space power and
has been signed by very few states. It is not binding as a treaty on
the non-party states and the claim that it represents customary
law is probably not credible.2"
It has also been pointed out that the very fact that the framers of
the Moon Treaty felt the need to write a new specific ban on
private property indicates that they did not feel the earlier
Outer Space Treaty had already accomplished such a
prohibition.24
III. EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
So the question is whether it would be an exercise of sover-
eignty, and therefore a violation of the Outer Space Treaty (es-
pecially Article 11)25 for the U.S. to pass legislation agreeing to
recognize the right of privately funded, permanent Lunar or
Martian settlements, regardless of nationality, to claim land
around their base. Most experts now seem to agree that the
22 See Lotta Vikari, Time Is of the Essence: Making Space Law More Effective, SPACE
POLIcv, Feb. 2005, at 1-5.
23 Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 1041,
1069 (1993).
The Moon Treaty introduces the concept of the common heritage
of mankind to considerations of space property law. The obliga-
tions incurred by states under this principle, and the Moon Treaty
itself, are unclear and have been the subject of much commentary.
Id. at 1068-69. That view was endorsed in an official review of the space treaties
by the Netherlands, one of the few nations that ratified the Moon Treaty:
Contrary to the other treaties, the almost complete lack of ratifica-
tion of the [Moon Treaty] Agreement by the world's States will pre-
clude any conclusion that the Moon Agreement would be endowed
with some measure of customary legal force as an elaboration of
the Outer Space Treaty with respect to a particular area (or num-
ber of areas) within outer space as a whole.
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Review of the Status of the Five
International Legal Instruments Governing Outer Space, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/
C.2/L.210 (Mar. 2, 1998).
24 Alan Wasser, The Law That Could Make Privately Funded Space Settlement Profita-
ble, SPACE GOVERNANCE, Jan. 1998, at 56.
25 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, art. II.
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Outer Space Treaty does not ban private property. The follow-
ing are several examples:
1) As law Professor Glenn Reynolds and National Review colum-
nist Dave Kopel say,
[i]t is widely agreed by space-law scholars that the Outer
Space Treaty forbids only national sovereignty-not private
property rights. If, later this century, Americans settle Mars,
they will acquire property rights to the land they settle ....
The American government may choose to respect the Mar-
tian settlers' property rights, and even defend them, without
violating the treaty's terms, so long as the government doesn't
proclaim its own sovereignty over portions of Mars ....
As independent settlers, they would not be bound by the
Outer Space Treaty, which only restricts the Earth-based gov-
ernments that have signed it.26
2) Joanne Gabrynowicz, a professor of law and the Director of
the National Remote Sensing and Space Law Center says, "[a]s
regards to property rights per se, the Outer Space Treaty is silent.
It contains no prohibition."27
3) Writing for the Fordham Law Review, Professor Stephen
Gorove, former Chairman of the Graduate Program of the
School of Law and professor of law at the University of Missis-
sippi, School of Law, said,
* . .the [Outer Space] Treaty in its present form appears to
contain no prohibition regarding individual appropriation or
acquisition by a private association or an international organi-
zation .... Thus, at present, an individual acting on his own
behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private associa-
tion or an international organization could lawfully appropri-
ate any part of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.28
Professor Gorove goes on to say:
... the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carry-
ing out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a
celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the ac-
tivities take place under tie [sic] supreme authority (sover-
eignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no
exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in
26 Glenn Reynolds & Dave Kopel, The New Frontier: Preparing the Law for Settling
on Mars, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, June 4, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/
kopel/kopel060402.asp.
27 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The International Space Treaty Regime in the Global-
ization Era, AD ASTRA, Fall 2005, at 30, available at http://www.space-settlement-
institute.org/Articles/IntlSpaceTreatyGabryno.pdf.
28 Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 349, 351 (1969).
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question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless,
the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-
ups for their state's activities.29
4) At the 50th International Astronautical Congress, National
Space Society ("NSS") representatives Pat Dasch, Michael Martin-
Smith, and Anne Pierce presented a report on space property
rights. The presentation concluded that "[s]everal important
principles have been established by customary law and treaty.
First, national sovereignty stops where outer space begins ...
Second, that national appropriation of the Moon, other planets,
asteroids, etc., is forbidden. And third, that private property
rights are not forbidden."3
Dasch, Martin-Smith, and Pierce noted that the third point
had been controversial for some time.3" But, they say, it is now
agreed that, "The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbids 'national ap-
propriation' of the Moon and other celestial bodies .... It does
not forbid private property rights on these bodies.""
5) Even attorney and space law consultant Wayne White, who
opposes the "Space Settlement Initiative" (proposed legislation
to utilize Lunar land claims recognition by the U.S. as the finan-
cial incentive to impel private industry to finance settlements on
the Moon),33 says: "Some interpret Article II narrowly to prohibit
only national appropriation. Many others interpret the clause
broadly to prohibit all forms of appropriation, including private
and international appropriation. When Article II is compared to
similar provisions in other documents, however, it becomes clear
that the narrow interpretation is correct.
34
Before the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was drafted by the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS"),
four other international legal organizations prepared draft reso-
lutions. All of these documents recommended non-appropria-
tion clauses which are broader than Article I1.35  The
29 Id. at 352.
30 Pat Dasch, Michael Martin-Smith, & Anne Pierce, Nat'l Space Society, Pres-
entation at the 50th International Astronautical Congress: Conference on Space
Property Rights: Next Steps (Oct. 4-8, 1999).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
34 White, supra note 19.
35 Draft Resolution of the International Institute of Space Law Concerning the Legal
Status of Celestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 467-69 (Andrew G. Haley & Mortimer D. Schwartz eds., 1966);
Institute de Droit International, Resolution on the Legal Regime of Outer Space, in C.W.
JENKS, SPACE LAW 416 (1965) (adopted unanimously Sept. 11, 1963); David Davies
Memorial Institute of International Studies, Draft Code on the Exploration and Uses of
2008]
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terminology in these clauses suggests that at the time the Outer
Space Treaty was drafted, international lawyers did not consider
"national appropriation" to be an all-inclusive phrase.
For example, a resolution of the International Institute of
Space Law ("IISL") specifically distinguished between national
and private appropriation: "Celestial bodies or regions on them
shall not be subject to national or private appropriation, by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation or by any
other means."36
6) A.F. van Ballegoyen says simply, "Article 2 of the treaty ...
needs to be interpreted in a restrictive, literal meaning, namely
as just the prohibition of national appropriation. This interpre-
tation would allow other entities like private companies and non-
governmental organizations to appropriate territory.
3 7
7) And, in the Connecticut Law Review, environment and energy
lawyer Lynn M. Fountain notes that, "[w]ithout assurance of
property rights, private industry will not invest in the develop-
ment of outer space. The right of continued use does not have
to mean a declaration of national sovereignty."38 Fountain fur-
ther acknowledges that:
The Outer Space Treaty only bans national appropriation of
celestial bodies. It does not specifically mention resources re-
moved from such bodies, nor does it specifically mention or
prohibit appropriation by private industry. The Moon Treaty
is more specific on both elements and thus has not been
signed or ratified by any of the space powers.39
These experts and many others agree that the Outer Space
Treaty does not ban private property on the moon, Mars, or
other celestial bodies.
Outer Space, in C.W. JENKS, supra, at 419; International Law Association, Resolu-
tion on Air Sovereignty and the Legal Status of Outer Space, in C.W. JENKS, supra,
at 167.
36 Draft Resolution of the International Institute of Space Law Concerning the Legal
Status of Celestial Bodies, supra note 35, at 468; White, supra note 19.
37 A.F. van Ballegoyen, Ownership of the Moon and Mars: The Land-Grant Act as
Means of Stimulating Human Settlement of Celestial Bodies, AD ASTRA, Jan./Feb. 2000,
at 37, available at http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/research-li-
brary/BallegoyenOwn.pdf.
38 Lynn M. Fountain, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced
by the 'Common Heritage of Mankind'Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1753, 1777 (2003).
39 Id. at 1777 n.156.
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IV. RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
If private property claims in space are legitimate under the
Outer Space Treaty, must the nations of the world pretend that
they are not, or could they publicly acknowledge that they are?
White points out that, "under international law states may do
whatever is not expressly forbidden. Restrictions upon the inde-
pendence of States cannot . . . be presumed."4 °
Clearly, if the Outer Space Treaty does not ban private prop-
erty ownership, it certainly does not contain a separate, special
provision expressly forbidding nations from recognizing that
fact. The long-accepted legal doctrine expressio unius est exclusio
alterius says that, when interpreting statutes, we should presume
things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.4 '
So what motivates those who proclaim that the treaty does ban
such recognition of private property? Some of those who make
that claim "believe only governments and government employ-
ees belong in space at all, ever, as a matter of principle and
safety. '4 2 Others are trying to justify their own competing ap-
proaches to space development. For example, some scientists
want the Moon reserved for research alone and everyone else
kept away.43 Some are fearful that development of competitive
space settlements might lead to armed conflict.44 And there are
40 Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7); White, supra note 19, at 4.
41 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is defined as: "A cannon of construction
holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,
or of the alternative;" also called "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 602, 604 (6th ed. 2003).
42 See Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9; see also Homer Hickman &
Rand Simberg, Why Is NASA the Only Game in Space?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007,
http://latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-dus-
tuploct01,0,3687593,print.story?coll-l1-home-commentary; Press Release, Space
Frontier Found., NASA Can Fix Its Budget Problems by Buying from Private In-
dustry Instead of Competing with It (Feb. 5, 2007).
43 See, e.g., Scientists Are Split on Whether Lunar Base is Too Ambitious, REDORBIT,
Jan. 7, 2007, http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/791549/scientists-are-split_
onwhetherlunarbase-is-too ambitious/index.html.
44 For example, G. Harry Stine, Patricia M. Sterns, and Leslie I. Tennen say
that "clearly, international peace and security would be served by the prevention
of conflict over competing terran [sic] claims to portions of the cosmos. The
resolution of this issue, therefore, was a universal prohibition of national appro-
priation in space." Patricia M. Sterns, G. Harry Stine, & Leslie I. Tennen, Prelimi-
nary Jurisprudential Observations Concerning Property Rights on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies in the Commercial Space Age, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH
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even people who believe that private property itself, especially
all land ownership, is an abomination, and should be made ille-
gal in the new world of space.45 For these advocates, whether or
not the Outer Space Treaty actually bans private property
claims, it should-and for them, that is the same thing. As a
result of such conflicting viewpoints, little progress toward space
settlement has been made in the thirty years since the Apollo
program.
V. DIFFERING LEGAL SYSTEMS: COMMON LAW
VERSUS CIVIL LAW
Some critics of private ownership of extraterrestrial land only
take into consideration the provisions of English common law.4
6
With common law, ever since William "The Conqueror" confis-
cated the old nobility's lands after 1066, all property rights have
derived ultimately from the King, or sovereign. So these critics
feel that a ban on private ownership is automatically implied by
the Outer Space Treaty's ban on national appropriation.47
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 53 (1997). By extension, states could
not license private parties to appropriate privately that which cannot be appropri-
ated publicly, because "wars of conquest also could result ...." See id. at 54. To
the authors it seems most unlikely that a settlement established by, for example, a
consortium led by Boeing and Energia would end up settling a dispute with the
Mitsubishi/Aerospatiale settlement by means of a "war of conquest." It should be
noted that Stine, Stern, and Tennen advocate an international agreement recog-
nizing a true permanent settlement's "autonomy... like unto another state" and
"capacity as a legal regime," "... an exinde civitas politicae, a political city-state in
space." Id. at 60. But, somehow, they don't mention whether that "city-state"
should have the right to claim even the land it stands on.
45 Space activist Paul Beich wrote a denunciation of Lunar land claims recogni-
tion saying: "capitalism is instead the primary obstacle to the .. . goal of a
spacefaring civilization." Paul Beich, Lettters: Will Capitalism Work?, AD ASTRA,
May/June 1998, at 3. Beich further wrote, "[c]apitalism is a disincentive for any
activity that does not directly or indirectly result in the production of wealth for
the elite. The profit motive is capitalism's euphemism for greed, and greed is a
poor motivation for anything, especially the noble and exciting human endeavor
of moving into the universe." Id.
46 See THOMAS GANGALE & MARILYN DUDLEY-RoWLEY, AMER. INST. AERONAUTICS
& ASTRONAUTICS, To BUILD BIFROST: DEVELOPING SPACE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND IN-
FRASTRUCTURE 1 (2005), http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Submis-
sions/To%20Build%20Bifrost.pdf.
47 See Ray T. Black, The Historical Background of Some Modern Real Estate Principles,
34 REAL EST. L.J. 327, 333-34 (2005); see also GANGALE & DUDLEY-RoWLEY, supra
note 46, at 1; Richard Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom
and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85, 88 (1992).
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Some even say that private property in space would be impos-
sible because it would need national sovereignty in space.48
However, in countries like France, which follow "civil law," prop-
erty rights have never been based on territorial sovereignty. a9
Instead, they are based on the "natural law" principle of pedis
possessio or "use and occupation"-that individuals mix their la-
bor with the soil and create property rights independent of gov-
ernment.5" Government merely recognizes those rights.51
Wayne White explains this point well.
The relationship between property and sovereignty differs under
common law and civil law systems. The common law theory of
title has its roots in feudal law. Under this theory the Crown
holds the ultimate tide to all lands, and the proprietary rights of
the subject are explained in terms of vassalage. Civil law, on the
other hand, is derived from Roman law, which distinguishes be-
tween property and sovereignty. Under this theory, it is possible
for property to exist in the absence of sovereignty.5 2
This is why "[i] n the discussions leading to the conclusion of the
[Outer Space] treaty, France [a civil law country] indicated more
than once that she was not altogether satisfied with the wording
of Article II ... ." France's representative was "thinking in partic-
ular of the risks of ambiguity between the principle of non-sover-
eignty- which falls under public law-and that of non-
appropriation, flowing from private law."53
A key realization is that the common law standard cannot be
applied on the Moon, where sovereignty itself is barred by inter-
national treaty.
As John Locke wrote, "As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants,
Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his
48 See GANGALE & DUDLEY-RowLEY, supra note 46, at 1; see also Henry R.
Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World:
Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CH. J. INT'L L. 81, 81 (2005).
49 See 0. Lee Reed, What is Property?, 41 AM. Bus. L. J. 459, 501 n.30 (2004).
50 "[Pledis possessio [Latin] A foothold; an actual possession of real property,
implying either actual occupancy or enclosure or use." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1201 (8th ed. 2004). Similarly, "pedis positio [Latin] A putting or placing of the
foot. This term denoted possession of land by actual entry." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1167 (8th ed. 2004).
51 See Epstein, supra note 47, at 85.
52 See White, supra note 19, at 6.
53 Id.; see also U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
Comm., Summary of the Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/C.2/SR.70 (Oct. 21, 1966).
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Property. '54 In other words, ownership can flow from the use of
the land.
A.F. van Ballegoyen points out,
Before the emergence of the nation-state it was both normal and
self-explanatory for non-state actors to own territory. Contempo-
rary emphasis on the state as sole organizer and regulator of both
domestic and world affairs ignores the enormous potential of
non-state actors to efficiently organize affairs up to a certain
point.55
In sum, there appears to be no explicit ban on private prop-
erty claims in the Outer Space Treaty, as there would have been
in the Moon Treaty. In addition, there is no explicit ban on
nations recognizing such private property in good faith, and
what is not explicitly prohibited in international law is generally
permitted.
VI. CONFUSION WITH INVALID ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM
Others who feel that land claims recognition would be a viola-
tion of international law are confusing recognition of a settle-
ment's land claim with what Dennis Hope, a seller of novelty
Lunar land deeds, does56 or are confusing it with a covert U.S.
seizure of the land for itself. In fact, the "Space Settlement Prize
Act"57 legislation proposed by co-author Alan Wasser as an ex-
ample of one way such legislation could be formed shows how a
land claims recognition law could be structured so that claims
would only be based on true occupation and use of the land,
with the U.S. not seizing or claiming the land in any way.
The only claims recognized would be those made by perma-
nently inhabited settlements-made by people who are, by then,
inhabitants of the Moon, and are no longer "Earthlings. '58 If
residents of Earth want to own an acre of Lunar land, they
54 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
55 van Ballegoyen, supra note 37, at 37. Similarly, Seneca, in De Beneficiis, said
.. . to kings belongs authority over all; to private persons, property. CHARLES M.
MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST: FROM THE GREEKS
TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 394 (1932).
56 Dennis Hope, The Lunar Embassy Website, http://www.lunarembassy.com.
(last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
57 Alan Wasser, Space Settlement Inst., Draft of an Act Proposed, http://www.




would have to pay the residents of the Moon for it, thus re-
warding these "Lunarians" for risking their lives and fortunes to
open the space frontier for all mankind.5 9
When the IISL recently issued a statement aimed at discredit-
ing claims like Dennis Hope's claims to the Moon (i.e., claims
with no legal basis such as use and occupation), some of those
who confuse The Space Settlement Initiative6 ° with Hope's "Lu-
nar Embassy" claims, tried to pretend that the IISL statement
applied to both.61 One of the authors of this paper, Alan
Wasser, contacted the Board of the IISL to ask if the statement
did, in fact, apply to both.
Dr. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana replied personally to say that it
certainly did not. He wrote "the Statement was without
prejudice to any future regime which might or should be devel-
oped. The statement indeed implies that there is a need for
further work to be done to cover the future developments relat-
ing to activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies.
62
Noted space lawyer Declan J. O'Donnell states that the legal
basis for Lunar land claims recognition, as described in the
Space Settlement Prize Act, is "a valid approach to real property
rights in space resources." He further stated that compared to
most of the proposals out there, [the] basic assumptions are not
radical at all."'63
59 See id. at § 4(7). Before the Outer Space treaty, it was always assumed, and
almost common knowledge, that the people who first settled on the Moon would
own it. For example, in Robert Heinlein's 1961 science fiction classic Stranger in
a Strange Land, the Federation High Court rules the Moon, which is owned by a
group of men who were sent, on the second ship to land there, by a private,
American-controlled Swiss corporation, launched from an island leased from Ec-
uador. See generally ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (1961).
Heinlein's court ruled that, although another ship, sent by the U.S. and Canada,
had been to the Moon first, it hadn't left anyone behind, and so "the real owners
were the flesh-and-blood men who had maintained the occupation-Larkin and
associates. So they recognized them as a sovereign nation and took them into the
Federation." Id. at 43.
60 See Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
61 Wayne White argues that the Space Settlement Prize Act would violate the
Outer Space Treaty, citing the IISL Statement. Wayne White, Homesteading the
High Frontier, AD ASTRA, Fall 2005, at 34-35.
62 E-mail from Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, President, International Institute of
Space Law, to Alan Wasser, Chairman, The Space Settlement Institute (Oct. 26,
2004, 20:54) (on file with author). Dr. NandasiriJasentuliyana is the President of
the International Institute for Space Law, which can be accessed at http://
www.iafastro-iisl.com/.
63 E-mail from Declan J. O'Donnell, Esq., to Alan Wasser, Chairman, The
Space Settlement Institute (Jan. 10, 2005, 13:24) (on file with author).
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Passing land claims recognition legislation now would mark
the beginning of a new legal regime that would fill the current
vacuum of enabling legislation. This regime would base prop-
erty rights outside of this planet on natural and civil law.
VII. NOT A U.S. LAND GRAB
Some of those who have written on this subject recognize the
need for property rights as an incentive for space development
and the ambiguity of the Outer Space Treaty, but are still mired
in the concept that space development can only be achieved as
it was during the Cold War-by nations and for parochial na-
tional interests. For example, in his Seton Hall Law Review arti-
cle, lawyer Brandon Gruner portrays the question of whether
the Outer Space Treaty permits private property solely in terms
of whether a nation, presumably the U.S., could use that permis-
sion to cheat the no-sovereignty rules.64 What Gruner does not
mention is the possibility of good faith claims made by genuine
private enterprise settlements, rather than citizens of any single
nation, and not acting as a front for any nation trying to slip
national appropriation past the rest of the world. But such good
faith property claims are the only kind that should be en-
couraged and allowed.
Any effort to establish a human space settlement is almost cer-
tainly going to be a multi-national effort. No U.S. company
could build a Lunar settlement alone.65 Participation by inter-
national companies will be a requirement in practice and could
be made part of the law.66 Financially, building a settlement will
be so expensive that it will have to be financed and owned by
Yes, the Space Settlement Institute has a valid approach to real
property rights in space resources. In fact, compared to most of
the proposals out there, your basic assumptions are not radical at
all. Remember, until there is an answer there is no answer. Only
time and effort and our working in the vineyard of space govern-
ance will solve the riddle. Technically, space resources appear to
be public property. That is my starting place. Then research it and
discover that individuals can get property rights in public proper-
ties, (but not in monuments). How to effect that is the open issue.
Id.
64 Brandon Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorpo-
rating 19th Century First Possession Principles Into the 1967 Space Treaty for the Coloniza-
tion of Outer Space in the 21st Centuy, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 299, 332-33 (2004).
65 See HARRISON H. SCHMITT, BUSINESS APPROACH TO LUNAR BAsE ACTIVATION
1-2, 4-5 (2002).
66 The Space Settlement Prize Act, supra note 57, at § 9 (1-3).
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stockholders from many different countries. 67 The Settlement
would have to use rockets and other components built in many
countries, be inhabited by the citizens of many other countries,
and would almost certainly launch from someplace outside the
U.S., such as Kazakhstan or the Kourou launch pad in French
Guiana.68
As Fountain describes it:
Given the high cost of space development, the formation of in-
ternational partnerships among private entities will be crucial in
any future development of outer space. Such cooperation has
the added benefit of ensuring that no one state monopolizes too
many of the resources. Additionally, partnerships would provide
developing states the opportunity to participate in ventures on a
modest scale .... Such states could provide scientists, engineers,
and/or a smaller percent of investment capital in exchange for a
smaller percent of the profits.69
Therefore, there is no reason at all for a settlement company
to place itself on the U.S. registry or choose to be under U.S.
jurisdiction, and there are good reasons for not doing so. To-
day, few, if any, ocean-going ships, choose U.S. registry rather
67 See SCHMITT, supra note 65, at 6.
68 A new Boeing airliner these days has to use components and whole sections
built in many different countries, and of course a lunar settlement would be
much more complex and expensive. The International Space Station is another
example of the need to use components and personnel from many different
countries for big projects, and, again, a lunar settlement would be much more
complex and expensive. No one company, no matter how large, has-or wants
to have-enough manufacturing capacity to do the whole job itself. Besides that,
the cost of manufacturing, especially labor, can be significantly reduced by doing
most of the work in multiple non-U.S. factories. Even more important, the fi-
nancing of really big projects requires raising money all over the world (often
from sovereign wealth funds) and, to please those international sources of fund-
ing and their governments, the expenditure of funds must also be spread
around. Similarly, international investors and their governments would certainly
insist that the settlement's crews include citizens from their countries. As to
where to launch from, commercial space launches from the U.S. are difficult,
expensive, and involve a huge amount of red tape. Other countries are likely to
be much more eager for the business and therefore much more accommodating.
Some might well offer significant financial incentives to use their space port. On-
erous U.S. regulations force almost all U.S. owned ocean going ships to register
under a flag of convenience like Panama and Liberia-and that reasoning will
apply even more in the case of big commercial space launches. Finally, the
Kourou launch pad in French Guiana, being closer to the equator than any U.S.
launch site can be, would probably be the most practical, efficient site to launch
from.
69 Fountain, supra note 38, at 1778, 1787 n.161.
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than a "flag of convenience."70 Therefore, the fact that the U.S.
chooses to recognize the land claims of Kazakh or Guyanese
companies, for example, could in no way be considered a U.S.
attempt to appropriate the Moon.7 1
VIII. "RECOGNIZE" VERSUS "CONFER"
There are other critics of Lunar land claims recognition who,
although they admit that the Outer Space Treaty does not pro-
hibit a settlement from claiming private property, nevertheless
claim it would be an act of "national appropriation," and hence
a violation of the treaty, for any nation to publicly recognize that
fact. 7 2 Their position boils down to the following: it is accept-
able for a private entity to claim property, but it is a crime for a
nation to recognize such a claim publicly. The reason these in-
dividuals fall into a "do not ask, do not tell" approach appears to
be a misunderstanding or a confusion between the terms "rec-
ognize" and "confer."
"To recognize" means to "acknowledge the existence, validity,
or legality of,"' 73 or "accepts, acquiesces to, decides not to con-
70 Vessel Operations Under lags of Convenience and Their Implications on National
Security: Hearing Before the Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine of the H.
Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) (statement of Rep. Hunter, Chair-
man, House Comm. on Armed Servs.).
71 As Henry R. Herzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, point out:
States are liable if they qualify as "launching State(s)" under Art
I(c) of the [Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, usually called] the Liability Convention,
which provides the following definition "(i) A State which launches
or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched. Whether "[a] State
which launches or procures the launching of a space object" in-
cludes a state whose citizens undertake an action in space depends
critically on the circumstances; the mere fact of a citizen being ac-
tive in space and thereby causing damage does not attach liability
to the state of which that individual is a citizen, at least according to
the Liability Convention.
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 48, at n.11 (citations omitted). Of course,
no state would be launching or procuring the launch of a private settlement's
ship, so the "launching State" would be the state from whose territory the space
craft is launched.
72 See, e.g., Jijo George Cherian & Job Abraham, Concept of Private Property in
Space-An Analysis, 2J. OF INT'L COm. L. & TECH. 211, 213 (2007); Lawrence D.
Roberts, Ensuring the Best of All Possible Worlds: Environmental Regulation of the Solar
System, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 126, 140-41 (1997).
73 COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005), available at http://
www.askoxford.com/concise-oed/recognize?view=uk. Similarly, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY defines "recognition" as: "1. Confirmation that an act done by an-
2008] LUNAR SETTLEMENT
test. '7 4 In contrast, "to confer" means to "grant (a tide, degree,
benefit, or right).' If a nation claims the right to confer, give,
or grant title to Lunar land, then it could be violating the ban
on national appropriation. But if a settlement is established and
the settlers claim private ownership of land around their settle-
ment, and a dozen of Earth's nations recognize the settlers'
claim, it is not reasonable to say that all dozen nations are trying
to appropriate the land and thus are violating the Outer Space
Treaty.76
As the proposed Space Settlement Prize Act points out,
U.S. courts already recognize, certify, and defend private owner-
ship and sale of land which is not subject to U.S. national appro-
priation or sovereignty, such as a U.S. citizen's ownership (and
right to sell to another U.S. citizen, both of whom are within the
U.S.) a deed to land which is actually located in another nation.
U.S. issuance of a document of recognition of a settlement's
claim to land on the Moon, Mars, etc., can be done on a basis
analogous to that situation.
77
other person was authorized .... 2. The formal admission that a person, entity,
or thing has a particular status." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1299 (8th ed. 2004).
74 Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
75 COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005), available at http://
www.askoxford.com/concise oed/confer?view=uk. Similarly, Black's defines
"grant" as: "1. To give or confer (something) with or without compensation ....
2. To formally transfer (real property) by deed or other writing." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 720 (8th ed. 2004).
76 Sometimes it is hard to tell whether writers are confusing "recognizing" and
"granting a claim" deliberately, or just through semantic carelessness. For exam-
ple, author Bill Carswell claims that Vigilu Pop said: "[F]or a private appropria-
tion of land to survive it must be endorsed by a state, but that state endorsement
of a private appropriation is interpreted legally as a form of state appropriation
and is therefore disallowed by the Outer Space Treaty." Bill Carswell, The Outer
Space and Moon Treaties and the Coming Moon Rush, SPACE DAILY, Apr. 18, 2002,
available at http://www.spacedaily.com/news/oped-02c.html. But he gives no
hint of whether he is using "endorse" here, to mean "recognize" or "grant." See
id. If a genuine permanent human settlement was established on the Moon, with
a space line shuttling between it and Earth, and it (as opposed to a Dennis Hope)
made a claim to private ownership of a reasonable amount of land around it's
base, the authors of this paper and many others would heartily "endorse" the
settlers' claim. Would that "endorsement" be interpreted legally as a form of
state appropriation-by us or the nations we are citizens of? The answer is no.
That "endorsement" would obviously mean "recognizing," not "granting," the
claim. So why couldn't every nation on Earth "endorse" the claim in exactly the
same "recognition" meaning of "endorse" without violating the OST (as they
would have if "endorse" meant "granting" a claim)?
77 The Space Settlement Prize Act, supra note 57, at § 2(13).
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IX. ARTICLES VI, VII, AND VIII OF
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Other critics attempt to construct a ban on private property
claims in space from various provisions of Articles VI through
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. v" Articles VI and VII make states
responsible to other states if, for example, a privately owned
rocket launched from their country lands in another country
and causes damage. 79 Article VII says "The State [Party to the
Treaty] on whose registry an object launched into outer space is
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object,
and over any personnel thereon," and Article V says that the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty must authorize and super-
vise its non-governmental entities and assure "that national activ-
ities are carried out in conformity with the principles set forth in
the present Declaration."8 0
But the treaty clearly does not contain any language explicitly
saying that states may not authorize their citizens to do anything
that they themselves cannot do, contrary to what some authors
appear to assume. The treaty does not say that what is prohib-
ited to states is therefore prohibited to private entities nor that
what is prohibited to the regulator is therefore always prohibited
to the regulated. A baseball coach gives "authorization and con-
tinuing supervision" to his players. Does the fact that the coach
is not allowed to run onto the field to catch a fly ball mean the
players he supervises cannot either? There are plenty of long-
standing precedents demonstrating actions that the U.S. itself
cannot perform legally, but which it can authorize its citizens to
do and can recognize when they have done so, such as adopting
a particular religion, numerous trade and commercial activities,
getting married,-or claiming land on the Moon on the basis of
use and occupation.
Private citizens do not suddenly become mere legal parts,
"creatures," or branches of the State because the State autho-
rizes and supervises their space activities.81 Citizens retain their
independent existence as separate legal entities.82 Therefore, if
the framers of the Outer Space Treaty had intended to mean
78 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, arts. VI-VIII.
79 See id. arts. VI-ViII.
80 See id. arts. VII, V.
s SeeJohn C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The Constitutionality of Congressional Execu-
tive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. RE\,. 757, 794-95 (2001).
82 Id.
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that States may not authorize their citizens to do anything which
they themselves cannot do, they would have written such lan-
guage into the Treaty explicitly. However, the framers did not
do this.83 They deliberately required only undefined "authoriza-
tion and continuing supervision" and compliance with the
Treaty."4 Declassified U.S. State Department records of the
treaty negotiations between the delegations headed by Arthur
Goldberg of the U.S. and Platon D. Morozov of the U.S.S.R.
show how these articles came to impose only that nominal bur-
den on private enterprise in space.85 The Americans, adamantly
opposed to the Communist proposal to ban all private enter-
prise space activity, stood fast until the U.S.S.R. agreed to those
substantially meaningless face-saving formulations.86
A.F. van Ballegoyen says of the Outer Space Treaty,
[I] t concerns only obligations and rights of states. The link be-
tween states and non-state actors comes in the form of the princi-
ple of responsibility. States would be, as they are now,
responsible for activities of their nationals or companies founded
under its law. It would be simple for the U.S. to insert rules of
behavior into licenses required by companies before they can
venture into space.8 7
The phrase "carried out in conformity with the provisions set
forth in the present Treaty" means just what it says. It requires
that non-governmental entities abide by what is in the rest of the
Treaty. Other than this phrase, the Treaty does not add any new
provisions. If the remainder of the Outer Space Treaty does not
contain any provision that bans private property in space, and in
this paper the authors have attempted to show it does not, then
"carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the
present Treaty" cannot be re-interpreted as a ban on private
property either.88
83 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13.
84 See id. art. V.
85 See generally Position Paper, supra note 15.
86 Id.
87 van Ballegoyen, supra note 37, at 37.
88 It is also worth remembering that, as mentioned earlier, there is no reason
at all for a multi-national settlement company to put itself on the U.S. registry or
to choose to be under U.S. jurisdiction, and good reasons for it not to do so. If it
is a problem, the U.S. need not be "the appropriate State Party to the Treaty" to
authorize and supervise a ship owned by, for example, a Swiss-registered com-
pany, owned by stockholders from all over the world (even if a majority of them
are American), crewed by citizens of a dozen countries, launched from Kazakh-
stan or Guyana and flying a flag of convenience. See discussion infra Part VII.
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Some experts argue that the very obligation to regulate pri-
vate space activities authorizes and requires states like the U.S.
to establish reasonable interim regulations for private property
ownership in space until a new treaty is negotiated that resolves
the current ambiguities.89
Professor Gabrynowicz proposes that the treaty could be mod-
ified by the establishment of,
S.. national laws that fill in or clarify legal gaps in the interna-
tional regime. Like the development of the maritime law that
preceded it, the national laws of spacefaring and space-using na-
tions can develop space law. This approach has been taken in
numerous space activities: launches, telecommunications, com-
mercial remote sensing, Earth observations and astronaut codes
of conduct, among others. 90
And, she adds, "[n] ow this is a particularly relevant time for this
particular route."9'
Robert P. Merges and Glenn H. Reynolds suggest that,
... some purely national law will emerge as a standard, or at least
as a model for other countries to follow. In other legal areas,
national leaders have effectively established patterns that have
been followed by other countries: commercial law in the United
States (as seen in the United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods) and patent law in Great Britain come to
mind. Similarly, in the space context, other countries could
adopt the basic framework devised in the pioneer country. Alter-
natively, private entities could specifically "opt into" coverage
under the pioneer country's laws-for example, by choice of law
provisions in private contracts. 2
Thus, they argue a jurisdictionally limited legal regime could
emerge as the de facto international standard."
X. WHAT TO DO ABOUT AMBIGUITIES
Regardless of their views on the questions raised so far, the
one observation on which nearly every expert agrees is that, as
space lawyer Ezra Reinstein states:
The Outer Space treaty is riddled with ambiguities. It is silent,
outside of affirming freedom of "exploration and use," as to what
89 See Gabrynowicz, supra note 27, at 31.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Resources, Common Property, and
the Collective Action Problem, 6 N.Y.U. ENxVrL. L. J. 107, 112 (1997).
93 Id.
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sort of rights parties can claim in celestial bodies. It is silent as to
the circumstances under which these unspecified property rights
might vest, that is, what a person must do to gain whatever prop-
erty right are available. 4
In fact, the framers of the Outer Space Treaty were deliber-
ately ambiguous about private property, as opposed to nation-
ally owned property, to allow ratification of the Treaty by both
the U.S., which wanted to encourage private enterprise in space,
and the U.S.S.R., which did not. 5
The U.N.'s Dr. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, a space lawyer, is one
of those who declares that the ambiguities were not only deliber-
ate but also the right thing for the time-"This was not a press-
ing concern in 1967, when the Outer Space Treaty was ratified.
It was perfectly acceptable at the time to consign a deeper dis-
cussion of property rights to future negotiation, as the United
Nations did."96
As prominent space lawyer Rosanna Sattler wrote in the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review, "The provision of the Outer Space
Treaty which has caused the greatest controversy and discussion
is found in Article II. . . . The appropriation provision of the
treaty is arguably unclear and undefined and therefore unwork-
94 EzraJ. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 71 (1999).
A different expert, who disagrees with us about private property, Milton L. Smith,
nonetheless comes to the same conclusion about the Outer Space Treaty's ambi-
guity. Milton L. Smith, The Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer
Space, in SPACE LAW: VIEWS OF THE FUTURE 47 (Tania L. Zwaan et al. eds., 1988).
Smith expresses his personal opinion that authorities who adopt the "literal inter-
pretation of the non-appropriation clause" and considers that the non-appropria-
tion clause applies only to nations go too far. Id. at 47. Then he debates whether
the Outer Space Treaty also bans taking exclusive possession of minerals mined
on the Moon, but concludes it does not. Id. at 48-50. He writes:
In summary, mining is a permissible exercise of the freedom of use
guaranteed by the Outer Space Treaty. Both the non-appropria-
tion and the freedom of use provisions, however, raise potential
problems for exclusive claims in outer space. The language of the
Outer Space Treaty is so broad and general that these provisions
are susceptible to varying interpretations. Since disagreement on
these issues exists, the Outer Space Treaty, of itself, cannot provide
a satisfactory legal regime ....
Id. at 50. He also says there are two ways to create a "commercially suitable legal
regime:" a new U.N. agreement, which he considers unlikely, or a private agree-
ment among the spacefaring nations, reached outside of the U.N., which he says
"would be fully compatible with the Outer Space Treaty." Id. at 54.
95 See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 7.
96 Reinstein, supra note 94, at 71 (citing OGUNSOLA 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 70-71 (1975)).
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able. '9 7 There is even some argument that this provision con-
flicts with the requirements of other multi-lateral treaties.9"
Kurt Anderson Baca goes even further. He points out that
Article II's provision on use and appropriation conflicts with
other multi-lateral treaties, contradicts other parts of the Outer
Space Treaty, and is so vague and ambiguous that it can only be
considered an expression of a wish, rather than a binding rule
on anyone.99 The most obvious of those self-contradictions is
that the very first words of the Outer Space Treaty are, "[The
States Parties to this Treaty], Inspired by the great prospects
opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer
space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes .... "100 Yet, by confusing the question of private prop-
erty and thereby discouraging private investment, the Treaty it-
self has blocked that "common interest of all mankind" for more
than three decades now. Unfortunately, in this kind of interna-
tional law, unlike normal domestic law, there is no judge nor
court with the authority to provide a binding ruling, so the dif-
ference of opinion and ambiguity will persist. 10 1
When a treaty is ambiguous, each signatory must interpret for
itself what its obligations are." 2 Therefore, regarding the ques-
97 Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to
the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 28-29 (2005).
98 Baca, supra note 23, at 1066.
99 Id. at 1068.
The interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that allows property
holding in space and quasi-sovereignty must, by inference, allow for
some form of reasonable first use method of allocation. Since the
Outer Space Treaty envisions use of space, but does not establish
any regulatory regime to oversee allocations of outer space, first use
is the only possible form of allocation. This could take the form of
occupation and reasonable use. But, it is still difficult to distinguish
this private appropriation with national sanction under national ju-
risdiction from a form of national appropriation at some level. The
Outer Space Treaty may simply be vague, and hence merely preca-
tory, on the issues of use and appropriation. The consequence of
this could be to make the treaty non-binding as creating no specific
rule on these issues by analogy to the treatment of Article I.
Id. at 1067-68.
100 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, pmbl.
101 See Gruner, supra note 64, at 340-41.
102 Id. at 351. Gruner points out many advantages of U.S. withdrawal from the
Outer Space Treaty but then adds: "Yet, unilateral withdrawal from the 1967
Space Treaty by the United States is not the only way to implement a model of
first possession; rather, any State might incorporate principles of first possession
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tion of whether the U.S. should recognize a settlement's claims,
the opinion of the U.S. government matters most. If the govern-
ment decides it would not be an exercise of sovereignty, then it
would not be an exercise of sovereignty.
White points out that The Law of Treaties states: "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in the light of its object and purpose."' 1 Clearly, the
ordinary meaning of the term "national appropriation" is appro-
priation by a nation.
XI. A PRECEDENT: THE DEEP SEABED HARD
MINERAL RESOURCES ACT
An excellent precedent illustrating how ambiguities of inter-
national law are, and should be, handled is the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act, 0 which has been on the books in
the U.S. since the mid-1980s and renewed and reaffirmed sev-
eral times since then. Many have argued that it would be an
exercise of sovereignty for the United States to award its citizens
exclusive licenses to mine the deep ocean floor under the high
seas of international waters.0 5 Many in the U.N. thought it
would be an exercise of sovereignty, and they drafted a Law of
the Sea Treaty trying to make the resources below international
waters "the common heritage of mankind.' 10 6
The U.S. Congress disagreed. Excerpts from the Deep Sea-
bed Hard Mineral Resources Act illustrate that the U.S. explic-
itly renounced its sovereignty:
§ 1401. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
12) it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration
for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the
deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of
reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise
of those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of
international law;
into an interpretation of the 1967 Space Treaty that retains the Treaty's broader
philosophical ideals." Id.
103 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
104 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1473 (West 2007)).
105 See Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in
Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 703, 736-37 (2001).
106 Id. at 736.
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(13) pending a Law of the Sea Treaty, and in the absence of
agreement among states on applicable principles of international
law, the uncertainty among potential investors as to the future
legal regime is likely to discourage or prevent the investments
necessary to develop deep seabed mining technology;
(16) legislation is required to establish an interim legal regime
under which technology can be developed and the exploration
and recovery of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed
can take place until such time as a Law of the Sea Treaty enters
into force with respect to the United States.10 7
§ 1402. International objectives
(a) Disclaimer of extraterritorial sovereignty
By the enactment of this chapter, the United States-
(1) exercises its jurisdiction over United States citizens and ves-
sels, and foreign persons and vessels otherwise subject to its juris-
diction, in the exercise of the high seas freedom to engage in
exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral re-
sources of the deep seabed in accordance with generally ac-
cepted principles of international law recognized by the United
States; but
(2) does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive
rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or re-
sources in the deep seabed.'
This is just the sort of thing the Congress could do-and just
the wording it could use-to create that tremendous prize for
the first true private space settlement. The U.S. could "recog-
nize" (acquiesce to or decide not to contest) the legitimacy of a
land claim made by the settlement which is using and occupying
the land itself, acting as a defacto but not de jure sovereign. At
the same time, the U.S. could state that it does not thereby as-
sert sovereignty or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the
ownership of, any areas or resources in space-just exactly as it
does under the high seas.
The analogy between private ownership rights without na-
tional sovereignty as conferred by the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act and a land claims recognition law for celestial
bodies is customary and accepted legal reasoning. For example,
General Counsel for NASA, Edward A. Frankle, in a 2001 letter
denying Gregory Nemitz's quixotic claim to ownership of the
asteroid 433 Eros, said:
107 30 U.S.C.A. § 1401.
10S 30 U.S.C.A. § 1402.
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Your [(Nemitz's)] individual claim of appropriation of a celestial
body (the asteroid 433 Eros) appears to have no foundation in
law. It is unlike an individual's claim for seabed minerals, which
was considered and debated by the U.S. Congress that subse-
quently enacted a statute, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Re-
source Act, P.L. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980), expressly authorizing
such claims. There is no similar statute related in outer space.' 0 9
Frankle clearly implies that, if Congress did enact a statute
like the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resource Act for space, it
would be a valid basis for an ownership claim under the law.
Most importantly, unlike the Nemitz claim to Eros, the claim-
ant's actual occupation and use of the land on the celestial body
would be an essential requirement."0
Julie Jiru adds:
The fact that the United States would use its own initiative to
invent a system with which it could live, rather than be subject to
the control of non-mining states and be forced to share profits, is
important to understanding the current position that the United
States takes in relation to space and space law. The United
States' reaction to the III LOS [Third Law of the Sea Conven-
tion] may be a good indication of the likely reaction to its ques-
tionable obligations under the Outer Space Treaty."'
XII. ANOTHER PRECEDENT: OWNERSHIP
OF LUNAR MINERALS
When the experts discuss the ambiguities of the Outer Space
Treaty, they usually mention two: 1) the ownership of minerals
removed from the land, and 2) the ownership of the land it-
self.' 2 The U.S. and Soviet governments resolved the first ambi-
guity by simply taking Moon rocks and declaring ownership of
them.113 As Thomas Gangale and Marilyn Dudley-Rowley, who
oppose Lunar land claims recognition, say in their AIAA paper:
Has there ever been a serious challenge to the US or Soviet/
Russian governments over their ownership (or at least their con-
trol) of the material they brought back from the Moon? These
109 Letter from Edward Frankle, Gen. Counsel, NASA, to Gregory Nemitz,
Chief Executive Officer, Orbital Development (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://
www.orbdev.com/010409.html.
110 See id.
"' Julie A. Jiru, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint Chips Off a Treaty's
Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 155, 161 (2000).
112 Sattler, supra note 97, at 28-29.
13 GANGALE & DUDLEY-RowLEY, supra note 46, at 1.
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precedents established a principle of customary law that "if you
take it, it's yours." Essentially, this derives from the Roman legal
principle of uti possidetis: "as you possess," so you may continue to
possess. I '
The second ambiguity could similarly be resolved by an inter-
national private settlement simply landing on and taking posses-
sion of a hunk of Lunar land." 5 The settlers could then offer to
sell pieces of their land to anyone on Earth in order to recoup
the cost of setting up the settlement and running a space line
open to all paying passengers, regardless of nationality.116 All
any nation of the world would have to do is not contest the set-
tlement's right to sell Lunar land deeds to its citizens.117
XIII. A THIRD PRECEDENT: FLEXIBILITY
(THE U.S.-IRAN TREATY OF 1957)
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution says all treaties made under
the authority of the United States shall be "the supreme Law of
the Land."'" 8 Those who demand the strictest possible interpre-
tation of the Outer Space Treaty sometimes cite that phrase, re-
jecting any flexible interpretation.11 9 In practice, however, the
U.S. government reserves to itself extreme flexibility to decide
what it can and cannot do under treaties,' 20 providing flexibility
far, far greater than the authors are suggesting in the case of the
Outer Space Treaty.
For one of many examples of that flexibility, consider the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Be-
tween the United States of America and Iran (the U.S.-Iran
Treaty of 1957), signed into law by President Eisenhower in
114 Id.; BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1582 (8th ed. 2004) ("uti possidetis= [Latin] 1.
Int'l Law. The doctrine that colonial administrative boundaries will become in-
ternational boundaries when a political subdivision or colony acieves indepen-
dence."). Obviously, that doctrine may have a further role to play in the future of
the Moon and Mars.
115 Planets for Sale! Dave Wasser, Alan Wasser, and Tom Gangale in Conversa-
tion, http://pweb.jps.net/-gangale/opsa/spaceEx/PlanetsForSale2.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2008).
116 Jobes, supra note 11, at 6.
117 See id. at 9.
118 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19 See, e.g., Kenneth Silber, A Little Piece of Heaven, REASON, Nov. 1998, available
at http://www.reason.com/news/show/30796.html.
120 See Lawrence J. Block et al., Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation: Commentary:
the Senate's Pie-In-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative
Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1481, 1506-07 (1989).
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1957.121 Because it is a self-executing treaty, was approved by a
two-thirds majority of the Senate, and despite ample provoca-
tion was never amended or withdrawn, the Constitution dictates
that this treaty is still the "supreme Law of the Land. 122
In Article VIII and elsewhere, the U.S.-Iran Treaty guarantees
the U.S. will give Iran as favorable trade rules as it gives any
other nation. 23 But in 1987, President Reagan, in reaction to
the Iran-Contra scandal, reportedly ordered a ban on trade with
Iran.124 For the past twenty years, in spite of the U.S.-Iran
Treaty, the U.S. government has prohibited commercial trade
with Iran. 125 Although challenged in federal courts several
times, judges have always avoided this apparent conflict between
the theoretical supreme law of the land and the actual law as it is
enforced by the U.S.126
XIV. PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS
Some critics assume that the purpose of Lunar (and similarly
Martian) land claims recognition is to protect Lunar residents
from claim jumping (stealing someone else's claim after it is
staked out but before it is recorded) and to allow them to com-
pletely exclude others from their Lunar land.127 This assump-
tion is incorrect on three different counts.
First, the sole purpose of land claims recognition is to gener-
ate an incentive for privately funded space development and set-
tlement by creating the only product that a successful space
settlement could sell to the public back on Earth for sufficient
profit to justify the tremendous cost of establishing the space
line and settlement. 12' This product is hundreds of millions of
paper deeds that are recognized by the U.S. government as
121 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the
United States of America and Iran, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899 [here-
inafter Treaty of Amnity].
122 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123 Treaty of Amity, supra note 121, art. II.
124 Elaine Sciolino, Reagan Bans All Iran Imports and Curbs Exports, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1987, at A12.
125 See Akbar E. Torbat, Impacts of the U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran,
28 THE WORLD ECONOMY 407, 410-11 (2005).
126 See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; see also Lawsuits Against the U.S. Government,
http://www.soudavar.com/index-files/Page431.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
127 See Leonard David, NEAR Landing Sparks Clain-Jumping Dispute, SPACE, Feb.
14, 2001, available at http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/near
claim_010214.html.
128 Jobes, supra note 11, at 9.
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bona fide deeds to acres of Lunar or Martian land, printed on
Earth for pennies apiece, but sold to Americans and anyone else
on Earth for investment or speculation, for perhaps one hun-
dred dollars each.
A claim for a circle of land with a radius of about 437 miles
around a settlement's initial base would contain about 600,000
square miles, which is about the size of Alaska and approxi-
mately four percent of the Moon's surface. 129 That 384,000,000
acres would be worth nearly forty billion dollars, even at the
conservative average price of one hundred dollars an acre. 1 0
That is the purpose of Lunar land claims recognition.
Second, unlike a gold rush mining camp, claim jumping is
not going to be a problem in early Lunar settlements. The set-
tlement and space line control access to the Moon, as well as
everyone's oxygen and food supply and ability to ship anything
back to Earth.' 3 ' The value of the land, at least in the early
years, is in the ability to sell deeds to speculators and investors
on Earth, and no one would buy stolen land from someone who
is not the recognized owner. 3 2 Since the settlement will be ea-
ger to sell land and/or provide transportation to and from the
Moon at reasonable prices, it would make no sense to spend
billions building one's own space line and then waste it stealing
already claimed land.'33
Third, the Outer Space Treaty will limit the ability to exclude
all others from your land. Article XII states:
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives
of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.
Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a
projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be
held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited.'
129 Id. at 7.
130 Id. at 8.
131 See NARAYANAN KOMERATH, JAMES NALLY, ELIZABETH ZILIN TANG, POLICY
MODEL FOR SPACE ECONOMY INFRASTRUCTURE 8, http://www.adl.gatech.edu/
archives/adlp05101701.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2008); see also Space Settlement
Initiative, supra note 9.
132 Jobes, supra note 11, at 7.
133 See id.
134 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, art. XII.
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All settlements and property owners will have to accept this rule
until and unless the Treaty is ever changed. Of course, even on
Earth, most private property is subject to such visits by officials
of local, regional, and national governments, especially if they
obtain the appropriate court orders. 1 5
Another limitation is imposed by the "benefit of all" require-
ment in the Outer Space Treaty's very first article, which says,
"The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries . . . ."" This is what would
require the space line and settlement to be open to all paying
passengers, regardless of nationality, as long as they are peaceful
and abide by the rules.
XV. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM 137
The falsehood of the proposition that the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits ownership of private property on the Moon13 can be
further demonstrated by carrying it to its logical conclusion. Im-
agine the Moon has been settled for a century. Hundreds of
thousands of people live there. Ships to and from various parts
of the Earth and Mars come and go from the main Lunar space
port every hour.
Will those hundreds of thousands of Lunar citizens still do
without any private property rights because of the two-century-
old Outer Space Treaty? Will no one own the land where they-
or their grandfathers-built their homes and factories? Will no
one ever own the land where that space port's giant terminal
buildings stand?
Even if that restrictive view of the Outer Space Treaty were to
prevail, sooner or later, and probably as soon as possible, Lunar
colonists would most certainly decide to scrap it and start claim-
ing ownership of the land they occupy." 9 Whether or not the
settlement is recognized as a government, it will certainly ac-
quire many of the attributes of a government, like deciding
which of its citizens owns what.
135 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct.
1989, 1993-94 (2007).
136 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, art. I.
137 In logic, disproof of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous
conclusion. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (8th ed. 2004).
138 See Carswell, supra note 76.
139 See Homesteading the High Frontier, supra note 61.
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At that point, the governments of the Earth will have to de-
cide what to do. Go to war against the Lunar colonists over it?
Of course not. They will spend endless hours in legal wrangling
about it, but in the end, they will have no choice but to acqui-
esce to some sort of reasonable Lunar property regime. The
U.S., and every other nation on Earth, will eventually have to
agree to accept and/or recognize the settlement's claims.
XVI. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH LAND FOR A SPACE
SETTLEMENT TO CLAIM?
Some critics ask whether an Alaska-sized claim on the Moon
would not be more land than a settlement could use, thus invali-
dating a land claim based on "use and occupation" under natu-
ral law.14° The answer is: the amount of land that a settlement
can-and must-use depends on what the land is being used for
and how much land the settlement will need to survive.
Everyone remembers "forty acres and a mule," but a cattle
ranch or modern agribusiness farm could not survive on that.
When settling North America, French and Russian fur traders in
the North needed vast territories to survive, much more than
English farmers in Massachusetts needed.' Space settlements
will need to be able to claim sufficient land to yield enough of
the only "product" the settlement can sell profitably enough to
guarantee its survival.
Space settlements cannot pay their bills by farming, fur trad-
ing, mining, or anything else that requires transporting a physi-
cal product back to the Earth. The only product identified so
far that a settlement could sell back on Earth profitably enough
to justify the settlement's creation is recognized land deeds. 14 2
When your livelihood depends on selling speculative Lunar land
that has been surveyed for sub-division but is otherwise unim-
proved, you can, and must, use a lot more land than an 1800s
dirt farmer could use.14 3
140 See id.
141 See generally Peter A. Thomas, The Fur Trade, Indian Land and the Need to
Define Adequate "Environmental" Parameters, 28 ETHNOHISTORY 359, 373 (1981). See
also Powell County Museum & Arts Foundation, The Fur Trade, www.pcmaf.org/
furtrade.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
142 Jobes, supra note 11, at 5-6.
143 It should be noted that the sale of speculative land deeds is intended to
repay the huge initial costs of developing safe, affordable, reliable human trans-
port to and from the Moon and Mars, and of using it to establish a space settle-
ment and space line. It will also support the space settlement in its early days.
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The ideal size for such a claim would be enough to justify a
competition to develop safe, affordable, reliable space transport
and establish a settlement, yet small enough to leave room for
future settlements. The authors calculate that a potential, rea-
sonable amount could be about 600,000 square miles, four per-
cent of the Lunar surface-a circle of land about 437 miles
around the initial base, roughly the area of Alaska.' 44
The next questions are how large a permanent settlement has
to be to claim such a piece of land, and would there need to be
at least one human being occupying each acre of land in the
claim from the very beginning? Wayne White, whose own plan
for Lunar property rights is strictly limited to such little land in a
"safety zone" that it would not constitute any particular incentive
for settlement, charges that Lunar land claims recognition fails
the "use and occupation" test. 145 He claims: "[natural law] re-
quires that claimants 'mix their labor with the soil' in order to
establish property rights, but the Space Settlement Prize Act
does not require actual occupation or physical improvement of
an area before title is granted."'46
White goes on to say "there is no precedent in terrestrial law
for granting or recognizing property rights without a physical
presence.' 4 7 While physical presence certainly must be re-
quired, historical legal precedence is, in fact, very much in
agreement with the standard described in the Space Settlement
Prize Act concerning how much land can be claimed around a
base.
For example, the Russian claim to what is now Alaska was
based on the first permanent settlement established by Gregor
Shelikhov on Kodiak Island in 1784.148 He was a Russian private
entrepreneur, and the fur-trading settlement established by his
Shelikhov-Golikov Company was strictly a commercial ven-
ture.' 49 Despite efforts to get the Russian government involved,
Eventually, however, the existence of the space settlement and space line will
make possible the development of many other more sustainable revenue produc-
ing activities. Some are predictable now, from astronomical observatories to tele-
vised low-gravity sports, but surely there will be many which we can not yet
predict.
144 Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
145 Homesteading the High Frontier, supra note 61.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Athanasius Schaefer, Fort Ross, http://www.athanasius.com/camission/
ftross.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
,49 See id.
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almost all they received from the State were ceremonial swords
and gold medals with the Empress' portrait. 150
Even after eighteen months, the entire settlement consisted
of only seven or eight individual dwellings, a number of bunk-
houses, a counting house, barns, storage buildings, a smithy, a
carpenter shop, and a ropewalk. 5' Its permanent Russian in-
habitants could not have numbered even one hundred men, all
clustered in one spot. 152 This was enough to claim about
600,000 square miles of Alaska and have the world accept it, and
in 1867, the U.S. government paid the then huge sum of
$7,200,000 for that claim.153
Even today, thousands of square miles of Alaska do not actu-
ally have a human being on them. 154 In fact, if you have ever
flown over Alaska, you know how much of the state still, two
centuries later, does not meet White's standard of actual occu-
pation or physical improvement, but Alaska is universally consid-
ered "occupied" and "in use.' 55  Alaska is an excellent
precedent for ownership of land on the Moon.
It is not only farmers who "mix their labor with the soil." The
pioneers who risk their lives and fortunes to establish the first
Lunar settlement, surveying the land for sale to pay the settle-
ment's bills, will have mixed their labor-and maybe their
blood-with the soil, and have every right to claim it.
XVII. "CHICKEN OR THE EGG" PROBLEM #1: PROPERTY
RIGHTS WILL EVOLVE NATURALLY
Another possible argument, based on the "inevitable" future,
is that there is no need to push the legal envelope by passing
Lunar land claims recognition now, because once a space settle-
ment is established, a property rights regime will evolve natu-
rally. It certainly is true that, if a permanent space settlement
were established without prior legislation, there would be claims
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See Sonoma.net, History of the Russian Settlement at Ft. Ross, California,
http://www.parks.sonoma.net/rosshist.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
153 U.S. Dep't of State, Purchase of Alaska, 1867, http://vww.state.gov/r/pa/
ho/time/gp/17662.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
154 See JAMES A. MILLER & R. L. WHITEHEAD, GROUND WATER ATLAS OF THE
UNITED STATES - ALASKA, HAWAII, PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS
(1999), http://capp.water.usgs.gov/gwa/chn/N-AKtextl.html (last visited Mar.
21, 2008).
155 See Homesleading the High Frontier, supra note 61.
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of property ownership in space that would have to be litigated at
length in the courts of the United States and other countries. In
fact, if no advance legislation has been passed, there will be out-
rageous property claims based on much lesser bases than actual
settlement. 56 This legal uncertainty scares off space developers
who fear that, after they have spent a fortune developing space,
they will only win the right to spend another fortune on legal
bills. 715  Worse, it would force unqualified judges to legislate in
haste from the bench, possibly producing very bad rules.
Reinstein says, "A legal system that is unclear as to the rights
of developers in the land they develop is almost as prohibitive of
positive development as a system forbidding development alto-
gether." 158 Antitrust and Trade Regulation lawyer David Everett
Marko adds, "Free enterprise institutions simply cannot make
significant investments in space while they are under the threat
of lawsuits over the meaning of treaty terms . . . . 15 Therefore,
it is not at all surprising that, without the incentive that ad-
vanced legal certainty would provide, space settlement is not
currently happening, and it probably never will.
A few space lawyers like Jim Dunstan argue that firm property
rights are unnecessary for space development,16 although this
belies the fact that space settlement seems no closer today than
it did twenty years ago when David Anderman said the same
thing. That is why Lunar land claims recognition legislation is
needed now, in order to create an incentive to make space set-
tlement happen at all.
Even the President's 2004 Commission on Implementation of
United States Space Exploration Policy recognized this need,
saying,
156 See Risley, supra note 2, at 59-61, 68-69.
157 See Reinstein, supra note 94, at 71.
158 Id. at 71.
159 David Everett Marko, A Kinder Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the
Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
293, 315 (1993).
-6 James E. Dunstan, Garvey, Schubert & Barer, Presentation to the National
Academies: Space Settlement: Homesteading on the Moon? Can I Own that
"Back Forty" on the Moon? Slide 16 (Oct. 26, 2006).
"If I can own pieces of space, and I can effectively own places in
space, and I can own intellectual property in space .... Do I really
need a formal property rights regime? It is NOT the lack of firm
property rights that has stopped space development, it is something
else .... It is expectations and perceptions that are the problem."
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The issue of private property rights in space is a complex one
involving national and international legal issues. However, it is
imperative that these issues be recognized and addressed at an
early stage in the implementation of the vision, otherwise there
will be little significant private sector activity associated with the
development of space resources, one of our key goals.' 61
Fountain says, "Another crucial element in attracting private
industry to the development of outer space is the protection of
property-both real and intellectual. Private industry will not
invest in outer space unless there is a significant return on the
investment."' 6 2 Twibell says, "Although a viable and lucrative
space industry exists, only a minute fraction of the industry's po-
tential is reached as a result of uncertainty created by space
law. "163
Rosanna Sattler says about the security produced by a clear
property rights protocol,
The establishment of a reliable property rights regime will re-
move impediments to business activities on these bodies and in-
spire the commercial confidence necessary to attract the
enormous investments needed for tourism, settlement, construc-




By not providing clear legal guidelines concerning the possible
property rights and rewards that make commercialization a ven-
ture at least worth trying, the repercussions of this treaty are con-
fusion, resulting in ill-will between the space-faring and non
space-faring nations, along with discouraging commercialization
and resource development in outer space.165
Congressman Tom Feeney (R-FL) also points out that the lack
of a private property regime is stifling investment in space,
The current international legal scheme covering space resembles
that governing the vastness of Antarctica. Similar results occur-
a human presence limited to scientific outposts. Contrast this
161 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. SPACE EXPLORATION POL-
icy, AJOURNEY TO INSPIRE, INNOVATE AND DISCOVER 34 (2004), available at http://
www.nasa.gov/pdf/60736mainM2M-report-small.pdf.
162 Fountain, supra note 38, at 1777.
163 Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Development
of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REv. 589, 610 (1997).
164 Sattler, supra note 97, at 27.
165 Jiru, supra note 111, at 156.
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dearth of economic activity to that found in Alaska's harsh
conditions.
[The reason for the difference is] this legal regime creates great
uncertainty about private property rights in space. Accordingly,
no private enterprise will undertake the high risk venture of ex-
ploring for mineral or energy sources on celestial bodies or any
other proposal to obtain economic gain from space activities.166
Still, some refuse to recognize this point. For example, Henry
Herzfeld and Frans von der Dunk proclaim,
Corporations exist to make profits, and property rights only mat-
ter to the extent that they are necessary to fulfill the objective of
maximizing profit. Popular literature and the statements of cor-
porate executives gives the impression that unless companies can
obtain ownership to space territory, they will not be able to invest
in space activities profitably. But in the reasonably near future,
no company operating in space will likely need outright owner-
ship of space territory, including land on the moon. 167
Of course, in the reasonably near future, no company is going
to operate beyond low-Earth orbit at all because there is no po-
tential profit in it as things now stand. Herzfeld and von der
Dunk overlook the fact that the only possible way that a legiti-
mate space settlement might make a profit is by being allowed
to legitimately claim, own, and sell recognized Lunar real estate
around the settlement. They fail to recognize that, if the sellers
of even ersatz claims (such as Dennis Hope) can make so much
money, any settlement that could sell real land ownership could
make a lot of money. Failing to pass a land claims recognition
statute now is effectively forfeiting the chance to create an abso-
lutely necessary incentive for space development.
As space businessman Gregory Bennett, then President of the
Artemis Society International, said in 2003: "[Land claims recog-
nition] clears the legal path for everything we want to do in the
realm beyond the sky. This may be the most realistic and achiev-
able way to accomplish our goal of establishing permanent
human settlements on the moon. It is certainly a necessary
step. 168
166 Tom Feeney, Private Property and a Spacefaring People, CPR NEWSL. (Coal. For
Prop. Rights, Orlando, Fla.), July 22, 2004, available at http://www.proprights.
com/newsviews/.
167 Herzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 48, at 91.
168 Moon Society and Artemis Society Endorse Space Settlement Initiative,
SPACEDAILY.cOM, Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/mars-base-
03b.html.
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Another paper that shows a fundamental misunderstanding
of the economics involved is by Thomas Gangale and Marilyn
Dudley-Rowley. It asks:
[I]f it were profitable for a company to go to the Moon and pick
up rocks, it would. But it is not profitable at this time. So, how
does it make it any more profitable if the company can claim title
to the land for miles around the rocks that are too unprofitable
for it to pick up, land that contains yet more unprofitable
rocks?' 69
The simple, vital point these authors overlook is that net
profit comes from sales price less expenses; revenues less ex-
penditures."' v Because of the astronomical expense of trans-
porting rocks back to Earth for sale, it is impossible to make a
profit selling rocks. But people on Earth would pay approxi-
mately the same price for a Lunar land deed as they do for Lu-
nar rocks sold en masse once the settlement is established,'71
and the cost of printing millions of those deeds and delivering
them to the customers is pennies apiece. Thus, even though
picking up rocks is nowhere near profitable enough for an es-
tablished settlement, the ability to sell legitimate, recognized
ownership of the land the rocks are on would produce revenues
in the scores of billions of dollars and earn billions of dollars
worth profit. Those billions of dollars of potential profit could
be a powerful incentive to develop space settlements.
A similar economic fallacy is the notion that land, in and of
itself, is somehow worthless until one either extracts valuable
materials or builds something valuable on it. If investors will pay
millions of dollars for it even if no physical use of the land has
yet been made, how can it be said the land is "worthless?" Any-
thing, by definition, is "worth" what people will pay for it. In
other words, the value is what the market will bear.' 72 It has
already been demonstrated that investors and the general public
are willing to pay millions for Lunar land from which nothing
169 GANGALE & DUDLEY-ROWLEY, supra note 46, at 5.
170 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1246 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "profit" as "[t]he
excess of revenues over expenditures in a business transaction").
171 Space Settlement Initiative, supra note 9.
172 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1639 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "worth" as "[t]he
monetary value of a thing"); Id. at 1586 (defining "value" as "[t]he monetary
worth or price of something; the amount of goods, services, or money that some-
thing will command in an exchange").
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has been extracted, on which nothing valuable has yet been
built, and nothing will be built for many years. 17 3
People will line up to pay money for recognized titles to acres
of speculative Lunar real estate just because they are part of
mankind's first permanent space settlement, which offers regu-
lar transportation back and forth, so the land could someday be
developed, and theoretically, they could visit someday.
It is amazing how many people have not yet adapted mentally
to the changes in the American economy in the last century.
These individuals still think that the only honest way to earn
money is in basic industries like farming or mining. These peo-
ple still have great difficulty believing that money earned selling
intangibles (entertainment, advertising, securities and, yes, spec-
ulative real estate) is just as real as money earned picking up
rocks and is a lot more profitable. If the customers get what
they paid for, it is just as honest and legitimate of a way to make
a profit.
Jeffrey Kargel, a planetary scientist at the U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, has written, "if you want to cross the bridge into the 21st
century of space [development], then space must pay its way
and give private investors a handsome early return on invest-
ment."174 The only way to do that is to pass legislation now, set-
ting the rules for property claims and legitimate land sales.
173 SeeJobes, supra note 11, at 7.
It isn't necessary to guess what the rock-bottom value for lunar land
would be, either. Over the last twenty-five years, an entrepreneur
named Dennis Hope unwittingly conducted an experiment that in-
dicates the potential market for lunar deeds ....
A nationally recognized real estate expert. Dr. Jeffrey D. Fisher,
believes Hope's sales of novelty deeds represent a fair comparison
with the real lunar deeds that may one day exist. As the director of
the Center for Real Estate Studies at the Indiana University School
of Business and professor of real estate, Fisher is an expert in the
science of property valuation .... He notes, "One way appraisers
estimate value is the comparable sales approach. That Mr. Hope
has been able to sell novelty deeds for lunar land at this price
[$19.95 per acre] may be an indication of the actual novelty value
per acre. If an entity were selling land sanctioned by the U.S. gov-
ernment, which would make the ownership rights more official,
then I can see the value being even greater."
Id.
174 Reinstein, supra note 94, at 72 (citingJeffrey S. Kargel, DiggingFor Gold: U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Plans for Mining Extraterrestrial Re-
sources, ASTRONOMY, Dec. 1997, at 48).
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XVIII. "CHICKEN OR THE EGG" PROBLEM #2:
REPLACING OR REVISING THE 1967
OUTER SPACE TREATY
Some experts suggest that, rather than trying to work with and
around the Outer Space Treaty, the solution is to amend the
Treaty, withdraw from it, or replace it with a new treaty.175 Many
propose specific provisions for a new international property
rights regime for space, and some of these proposals are quite
good. 176 The development of an international legal regime for
recognizing and protecting extraterrestrial property rights, if it
were set up to encourage rather than discourage privately
funded space settlement, would probably provide an important
stimulus for space development and settlement.
The problem is that there is no way to get the United Nations,
the U.S. State Department, or the world's foreign affairs depart-
ments to even consider such a thing. Many have written about
what the new treaties should say, but to the author's knowledge,
not one has proposed a realistic way to "get there from here"...
to make a new treaty actually happen.
As far as the world's diplomats are concerned, there are far
too many problems in international relations to "waste" time ar-
guing about space property rights just to promote space devel-
opment. 177 The last thing they want to do is to add to their
175 See generally Risley, supra note 2.
176 Reinstein, supra note 94, at 72 (stating "[w]hat is needed is an amendment
to the Outer Space Treaty, one that both clarifies and expands property rights in
space."); see also Risley, supra note 2, at 56, 66 (stating "the United Nations or a
body with authority to govern the activities in outer space . . . must amend the
space law to allow nations and individuals to recover the costs of missions to
space, and even acquire wealth from space."). Heidi Keefe suggests a global or-
ganization that represents all the people of the Earth be created to lease out land
in space. Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the Cur-
rent Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 345,
367 (1995). Fountain proposes a "Regulatory Agency" to
create an equitable, efficient, and stable legal environment for the
commercial development of outer space . . . promote cooperation
and opportunity for all interested states, as well as for private indus-
try... to promote productivity, investment, and the development
of expertise; to protect property and profits; to promote interna-
tional cooperation; to develop a set of affirmative duties; and to
provide a forum for dispute resolution.
Fountain, supra note 38, at 1776. But Fountain has no practical suggestion as to
just how to make this agency actually come into being. None of the others deal
with that problem either.
177 See, e.g., Merges & Reynolds, supra note 92, at 107-08; Douglas 0. Jobes,
Space Settlement Inst., After Appollo Why Didn't Space Settlement Happen?,
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already huge work load by opening what will certainly be a can
of worms, when they see no pressing reason to do so at this time.
They also know that any attempt to get the United Nations to
negotiate an effective new treaty offering huge financial rewards
for space development could easily backfire and result in an-
other effort by greedy leaders of many non-spacefaring nations
to extort money, or other personal benefits for themselves, from
those who want to promote human space settlement.178
There is too much affection for the good parts of the Outer
Space Treaty, especially its ban on weapons of mass destruction
in space, to expect the U.S. Congress to ever just pull out of the
whole Treaty.179 The U.N. could only take up the subject of re-
vising the treaty or drafting a new one at the formal request of
member states,18 ° and there does not even seem to be much
prospect of getting any state to do that. Why should they? In
fact, it would probably be even more difficult to get the U.S.
Congress to call for the U.N. to draft a new treaty on the subject
of space property rights-or worse, withdraw unilaterally from
the Outer Space Treaty-than it would be to get Congress to
pass Lunar land claims recognition legislation.
But if the U.S. Congress passed such land claims recognition
legislation-if it even looked like there was a serious possibil-
ity-then that, in itself, would force the world's diplomats to
consider the subject. Suddenly, they would be forced to choose
between coming up with a good new multi-national treaty, or
continuing to do nothing and thereby leaving the U.S., and
whatever nations decided to join it in bi-lateral agreements, to
act independently.
The U.S. would have charted a clear alternative path that the
space-faring nations could follow if a useful treaty cannot be ne-
gotiated. Therefore, there would be much less likelihood of a
bad treaty emerging, since the space-faring nations could so eas-
ily refuse to ratify it. Therefore, the best, and possibly the only,
way to make a new multi-national treaty actually happen is for
the U.S. Congress to start the ball rolling by passing something
like "The Space Settlement Prize Act."
http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/30years.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2008).
178 See Fountain, supra note 38, at 1758-60.
179 SeeJayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs,
United Nations, Opening Remarks at The Outer Space Treaty at Thirty-Five (Oct.
14, 2002), available at http://disarmament.un.org/speech/14oct2002.htm.
180 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 13, art. XIV.
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XIX. CONCLUSION
Despite certain conventional wisdom, the Outer Space Treaty
does not in fact appear to ban private property in space. Na-
tions could recognize land ownership claims made by private
space settlements without being guilty of national appropriation
or any other violation of the Treaty. Land claims recognition
legislation would, therefore, be perfectly legal under existing in-
ternational laws. Such legislation would be the best way to pro-
mote privately funded space settlement, and in fact, may be the
sine qua non for the expansion of the habitat of humanity be-
yond the Earth.
This is not an arcane discussion of legal theory, but rather a
call for immediate action-a single enabling act that will cost
nothing but will act to lever the opening of the new frontier.
The U.S. Congress should, in its next session, consider a bill like
The Space Settlement Prize Act181 to legitimize the property
rights of individuals in space and create the financial reward sys-
tem (at no cost to the government) that will make true space
settlement actually happen.8 2
181 The Space Settlement Prize Act, supra note 57.
182 In September 2007, during a NASA-sponsored discussion of space property
rights policy in Washington D.C., a NASA official raised the interesting question
of whether a Presidential Executive Order could be used, instead of Congres-
sional legislation, to establish land claims recognition as a national policy. This
would certainly appear to be an idea worth further study.
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